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51iews of payment systems competition
have evolved during the past genera-
SI’ tion. When automated teller
machine (ATM) netw-orks were first
created in the 1970s, policymakers consid-
ered two models for these emerging
networks: (1) a monopoly/public utility
network model, with open access
obligations and (potentially) some
form of regulation or (2) a competing
network model, with numerous networks
competing in a lightly regulated
environment. This article describes how-
these visions of network competition have
evolved. Even though the network
competition model was chosen in the
1970s, because of a history of nonenforce-
ment by antitrust agencies and regulators,
it appears that by the close of this century
the monopoly/public utility model may he
victorious. This article describes how that
change occurred and considers whether it
is appropriate.
The first section of the article
describes general trends in antitrust
enforcement affecting payment systexns
networks since the I 970s. The next
section examines the framework applied to
antitrust analysis of ATM network mergers
and is followed by a section applying this
analysis to two recent ATM network
mergers. The article examines how the
monopoly/public utility model appears
to have prevailed in the ATM network
merger context.
THE SEARCH SOR. PAYMENT
SYSTEMS CO.MPETITUON:
TRENDS ill EN.EORCEMENT
•The 1920-s — Providing the
Opportunities hr Network
f/on-ipetition in New Marl,,ets
As the technology for automated pay-
ment systems arose, Congress perceived
the need to address the creation of these
systems in a single forum, and created the
National Commission on Electronic Funds
Transfer (NCEFT). The Antitrust Division
of the Department ofjustice (the division)
played an important role in informing the
NCEFT whether and in what form
competition could arise in the newly
formed networks.
One important question addressed by
the NCEFT was whether these networks
would be natural monopolies because of
the substantial processing efficiencies
involved. At the time, some commentators
argued that, because a single network
could serve all ATMs at lower cost, these
networks were natural monopolies. Based
on that conclusion, they argued that the
networks should be open, that is,
compelled to share their facilities with all
financial institutions in a given area,
In proceedings before the T’ICEFT, the
antitrust division opposed the concept of
mandatory sharing, in particular because it
would deter the incentives to create com-
peting networks.’ The NCFFT adopted
the division’s view. It observed that
mandatory sharing “would inevitably
‘See U.S. Deportment of Justice
(1977).
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‘See EFT hr the United Stotes
(1977).
At the time, b ecouse ATM
networks were in their infancy,
there were no significant barri-
ers to entry.
‘See Rule, reprinted in Baker
and Brandel (1988).
‘See laderman (1990).
The division has a procedure,
known as a business review,
which ituses to indicate




See infra notes 35-36 and
accompanyrng rest, he uoard
did appear to consider whether
a proposed network “may rep-
resent so large a proportion of
possible ATM terminals in local
markets that no other switclres
could successfully compete.”
See Barclays larrk PLC
(1985); Centerre
Bancarporotion (1983).
result in fewer competitors.... Maximum
competition usually spells rapid
technological improvement and lower
prices to consumers.” Thus the commis-
sion expressly rejected any sharing
requirement, based on its assessment that
there was potential for the creation of a
number of competing networks.’
The division continued to advocate
its vision ofnetwork competition in a
number of forums. It actively opposed
the adoption of state sharing statutes.’
The division argued that mandatory
sharing would undermine the incentive to
create networks in the first place by
creating a free rider problem. That is, if
the creator of a network knew it would
have to share ownership with others and
share the fruits of its efforts after the
network succeeded, it might he deterred
from creating the network in the first
place. Moreover, the division suggested
that mandatory sharing would lead to the
formation of monopoly networks.
Despite the division’s intervention,
many states adopted various forms of
mandatory sharing. Since these laws
require a netw-ork to admit any bank as a
member, they dampened the opportunity
for intersystem competition. More recent
economic analysis of these sharing laws
suggests that the division was correct in
suggesting that mandatory sharing would
not, serve the interests of consumers. In
those states with mandatory sharing laws,
outptnt in terms of ATM deployment and
card usage is less than in those states that
do not require sharing.’
In the I 970s, scores of ATM networks
were created. lwhen these networks
appeared to interfere with the potential for
network competition, for example, by
being too large or overinclusive, the
division raised concerns and threatened
enforcement action. In 1977, the division
issued a business review letter refusing to
clear a proposed statewide electronic funds
transfer (PET) network in Nebraska,
prianarily because of the proposed
venture’s all-inclusive nature,” At the time
of the letter, the proposed network
comprised 66 percent of the commercial
banks in the state, which collectively
accounted for 86 percent of deposits. The
network attempted to justify its size based
on the amount of capital required, the
degree of risk, and the economies of scale
involved in operating an EET system. The
division concluded that these efficiencies
did not necessarily justify the all-inclusive
nature of the proposed network.” Because
of the division’s action, competing
networks were created in Nebraska,
and other networks avoided becoming
over-inclusive.
The I98’Os—&onamics of Ubiquity
lake Center Staqe
In the 1980s, the division basically
disappeared from the enforcement radar
in payment systems. The lack of enforce-
ment, especially in the merger area, was
based on the recognition that there were
efficiencies from the consolidation of ATM
networks. Charles Rule, former assistant
attorney general of the Antitrust Division,
discussed this factor in a 1985 speech.
Rule stated that the division was focusing
more on the economies of ubiquity and the
resulting consumer benefits achievable
by widespread sharing of ATMs. Rule
observed that the consolidation of ATM
networks benefits consumers by among
other things, increasing the available ATMs
in a single network; similarly increasing
the number of cardholders tends to
increase the deployment of ATMs. Thus
Rule indicated that the division would not
challenge the creation or merger of shared
ATM networks based on size alone.’
Unsurprisingly the division did not
challenge, or even apparently investigate,
any ATM mergers during the 1980s. The
Federal Reserve Board approved even’
ATM merger before it because it viewed
the A’I’M network as primarily a systeun of
computers and consec~uent.ly focused
almost exclusively on the networks’
“hack office” operations when approving
these mergers.”
Perhaps the most notable merger was
the 1988 acquisition of the Cashstream
netw-ork by the MAC network in 1988—
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two mid-Atlantic networ-ks which
competed in Pennsylvania and Newjersey
The division did not challenge the merger.
Rather, the merger was the subject of a pri-
vate antitrust challenge brought by The
Treasurer, a competing ATM network. A
district court rejected this challenge in The
Treasuret Inc. v. Philadelphia Tvational Bamh.
The court adopted an approach similar to
the Board’s—that the relevant market
included anyone capable of providing
computer processing and that market was
unconcentrated, MAC continued to
acquire almost all of its neighboring
networks, ultimately securing a dominant
position in Pennsylvania and many
adjoining states.
PULSE business review. The one
matter that forced the division to confront
intersystem competition was a business
review request submitted by the PULSE
ATM network in 1983. At the time
there was aggressive competition in Texas
between two similar sized networks:
PULSE and MPACT. MPACT,in particular,
competed through an incentive price
program. First Texas Savings and Loan,
a member of MPACT, sought tojoin
PULSE, and PULSE declined,
PULSE was faced with a peculiar
quandary posed by the antitrust laws.
IfPULSE refused to admit the hank,
First Texas could claim that its exclusion
from PULSE constituted an illegal
group boycott and it could seek treble
damages in a private antitrust suit.’° If
PULSE admitted First Texas, this would
create a de facto merger with MPACT,
and PULSE might face a government
antitrust challenge because the network
had become too largeand the merger
elinnnated intersystem competition.’’
Faced with this dilemma. PULSE
sought a business review from the
division. PUT_SE posed three alternatives
to the division: (I.) admitting First
Texas; (2) generally admitting members
of competing networks; or (3) implementing
an anti-duality rule, that would prohibit
membership to members of counpeting
networks.
The division addressed only the first
alternative, saying that at the time,
admitting First Texas would not pose an
antitrust violation. The division noted
that the incremental consumer convenience
that would result from admitting First
Texas appeared to outweigh the loss of
rivalry that might occurbetween the two
competing networks.” The other two
alternatives were not addressed because
they were not considered ripe for review
Facedwith the lack of support from the
division and the potential of a private
antitrust suit, PULSE admitted FirstTexas.
The impact on intersystem competition
was immediate; within six tnonths of the
business review letter, practically every
MPACT member joined PULSE. MPACT
eliminated its incentive pricing. There was
a similar effect on consumers, as several
banks increased their consumer fees.
The States intervene—The Entree
Lose
Because of the division’s inaction,
attention to intersystem competition issues
seemed dormant and ATM network
consolidation seemed uncontroversial.
This trend changed in the late 1980s with
the challengeby state attorneys general
(the states) to the formation of the Entree
national point of sale (POS) joint venture
between VISA and MasterCard.” At the
time, POS was in its infancy and was per-
ceived as a competing (and perhaps
superior) technology’ to ATM networks
and credit cards. VISA and MasterCard
had informed the division of the formation
of Entree, hut no enforcement action
was taken,
The states alleged that VISA and
MasterCard violated the antitrust laws
through the formation of the Entree POS
debit program, their respective acquisitions
of interests in PLUS and CIRRUS (the
national ATM networks), and VISA’s acqui-
sition of lnterlink, a California POS
network, The states alleged that by
forming Entree and acquiring the ATM
networks, VISA and MasterCard sought to
retard the development of on-line P05
“Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1(1988), pro-
hibits certain restmaints of trade.
Courts have held that the
denial of membership in a joint
venture mnoy violate Section 1 -
See Nocthwest Wholesale
Stationecs, Inc. mc Pacific
Stallonecy & Pcintiny Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985).
‘‘Up until that time both net-
works were exclusive. If First
Texas was a member of both
networks, it would serve as a
gateway and could eruoble any
bank inane network to occess
the ATMs in the ather network.
Dace the exclusiviti provisions
were bridged, arguably intersys-
tem competition between the
two netwarks would diminish.
“See letter fran William F.
Baxter, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division,
to Donald I. Baker
(Aug. 3,1983).
“See State of New York v. YISA,
U.S.A. and /d,ostecfocdIntl
Na. 89-Civ,-SD43 (S.D.N.y.
filed July 26, 1989).
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“See State ofNew Yock mc VISA




‘‘See “Bankers are Burying
the Hatchet” (1994);
Balto (1995).
“The switch fee is the fee
charged by the network for
moving a transaction over
the network’s switch. The
interchonge fee is a fee paid
between the nerchont bank
and the cardholder’s (con-
sumer’s) bank for processing a
credit card or debit cord transoc-
tion. Bath fees are set by the
bankcard association.
See “Bank of America’
(1994); “Debit Card War’
(1994); ‘lcaaamics—Mare
Issuers” (1994) for a descrip-
tion of campetiton in
interchange fees.
debit, a payment system they feared would
compete with and erode the profitability of
credit cards. Entree, the states alleged, was
a combination of the five most likely
entrants into the POS market, The states
further allegedthat as part of the joint ven-
ture, MasterCard and VISA had agreed not
to introduce their own separate systems to
compete with Entree. As parc of their alle-
gations, the states challenged provisions in
the Entree agreement that limited its mem-
bership to banks that were members of
both associations, thereby excluding
nonbanks such as Sears/Discover Card and
American Express.
The complaint sought divestiture of
CIRRUS (by MasterCard) and PLUS and
Interlink (by VISA), as well as an
injunction against the implementation of
Entree. In T990, VISA and MasterCard
agreed to abandon the Entree joint
venture.” VISA kept its ownership of
Tnterlink, and both card associations were
permitted to keep their interests in the
national ATM networks.”
Although arguments about the
economics of ubiquity may have beenper-
suasive in other contexts, they did not
persuade the state attorneys general
involved in the Entree case, One could
argue that a single national POS network
would have offered the opportunity for
greater customer convenience by putting
all of the POS terminals in a single
network. Similarly aggregating all of the
cardholders in a single network may have
persuaded merchants to use the new POS
network. A single network may have fos-
tereddevelopment of the new technology
But these arguments were unavailing. The
states recognized that even if a single net-
work might present some of these
efficiencies, they were outweighed by the
potential loss of competition between
competing P05 networks.
Five years after the settlement it
appears that the states’ assessment was
correct. After the settlement, VISA and
MasterCard created their own independent
POS programs (Interlink and Maestro,
respectively). In response to the concerns
of the states, each of the national POS net-
works adopted anti-duality rules, which
prevent anybank member from belonging
to a competing network. Competition
between the networks, in terms of product
promotion, product development, and
pricing, has been aggressive and far more
significant than that in the credit card
market, where duality is permitted.”
Each of the networks has competed
vigorously to sign up both banks and mer-
chants. Both networks haveadopted
different switch and interchange fees, to
make more attractive packages for
consumers.” The fees charged by the net-
works, including interchange fees, are far
less than those charged by credit card
networks.” lnterlink charged additional
annual card service fees and merchant
location fees. When Maestro entered, it
did not charge these fees, Of particular
significance, Interlink initially charged a
transaction servtce fee of $0.02 for every
transaction conducted by an Tnterlink
cardholder at an lnterlink terminal even if
the transaction was actually processed
through a regional network (in other
words, if the bank attempted to bypass the
Interlink network). Maestro entered
withoutsuch a bypass fee, and its entry
forced Interlink to eliminate the fee.
In April T994, Maestro sought to elim-
inate its anti-duality rule to permit issuer
duality After considering the proposal for
several months, the states rejected it in
December T994, The states observed that
both networks were competing aggressively
and that the networks appeared to he
thriving in terms of transaction volumes
and merchant participation. Moreover,
unlike other payment system markets,
competition from nonbanking participants,
such as Discover Card or American
Express, was unlikely because debit card
services are necessarily linked to a
financial institution’s demand deposit
account. Most important was the states’
concern that eliminating Maestro’s anti-
duality rule -‘would bring to an end the
aggressive intersystem competition
between the two bankcard associations” in
the P05 market. Thus the states concluded
that they could not assureMaestro that
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elitnination of their anti-duality rule would
not lead to an enforcement action.”
For the states, abstract arguments
about efficiencies were simply a guise to
deter the emergence of intersystem compe-
tition. Their enforcement action led to
increased intersystem competition and
concomitant benefits for consumers.
As important, the Entree case began to
affect how regulators and enforcement
agencies assessed the opportunities for
network competition.
The I9’YLis-’-”kene’wed Atlerptk’n to
fyfr’~,uc~rl. Carnpe4itian
Exclusive processing rule challenged—
MAC ATM network settlement. The
reemergence of the division in the payment
system competition venue occurred in
April 1994, when the division challenged
the exclusivityrules of the MAC ATM net-
work. In the six years since the division
took a pass on the Cashstream acquisition,
MAChad acquired almost all of irs neigh-
boring competing networks, had a
monopoly in several mid-Atlantic states
and had become the largest ATM network
in the United States. At issue at this point
was not a merger, hut rather certain exclu-
sivityarrangements that VAC used to
enforce its monopoly position. The
division challenged these restrictions as
illegal tying and monopolization, under
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.”
To understand the action, we set
l’orward the different functions of an ATM
network. In its most basic sense, an ATM
network comprises a trademark, a
computer switch, and a set of rules. Some
networks have their own computer system
that drives the computer switch;other net-
works contract for that service, Some
networks engage in “processing,” that is,
they drive (operate) their members’ ATMs;
other necworks permit their members to
drive their own ATMs or use third-party
processors, such as EDS Corp. This
market for “ATM processing” was the
focus of the division’s enforceunent action.
At the time of the enfoi-cement action,
Electronic Paymnent Services (EPS), which
operates the MAC network, was ajoint
venture of four bank holding counpanies:
CoreStates Financial Corp., Banc One
Corp., PNC Bank Corp., and Society Corp.
The MAC network has approximately a
90 percent market share in Pennsylvania
and a dominant position in adjacent mid-
Atlantic states. The MAC network handles
92 unillion transactions each month for
27 million depositors at more than
13,000 ATMs.
Most ATM networks are nonexclusive,
that is, they permit their members to
belong to any of a number of networks.
Until 1992, MAC generally did not permit
its bank members to participate in rival
ATM networks. These exclusivity rules
created an almost impervious barrier to
competitive entry because ifa bank
wanted tojoin a competing network it
would have to withdraw all of its ATMs
from MAC. Faced with that all-or-nothing
decision, few banks chose to align with
competing networks.” The rules helped
MAC acquire and maintain its dominant
position in the market. The rule against
multiple affiliations was formally dropped
in 1992 after being challenged in a private
antitrust suit.”
In this case, the division’s focus was on
other rules which restricted the ability of
banks to participate in other networks or
use competing third-party’ processors. The
division alleged that a rule that required
banks either to obtain ATM processing
from MAC or to provide ATM processing
in-house (which is prohibitively expensive
for many smaller banks, thrifts, and credit.
unions) effectively made it impossible for
these smaller banks to belong to rival net-
works while belonging to MAC. MAC
generally forbade its network meunhers
from obtaining ATM driving from any of
the several third-party’ processing firms
that provided that service.
The MAC rules and practices, the
complaint alleged, “prevent willing buyers
and sellers from conducting business at
competitively determined prices and
terms.” By preventing banks froun
obtaining ATM processing from others,
MAC effectively prevented these banks
“See “State Antitrust Dificials’
(1994).
“ United States v. Electronic
Payments Services, Inc.,
No. 942D8 (D. Del. Apr. 21,
1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 24,711
(May 12, 1994), 59 Fed.
keg. 44,757 (Dct. 14, 1994).
“As the division observed, ‘The
smoll banks that wish to join
onother network (which might
offer ATM network access at
Iawer prices) will nat be able to
do so unless the other network
has enough of o presence to
pravide small banks’ depositors
with sufficient ubiquity and con-
venience. The entrant network,
of course, cannot achieve the
criticot mass necessary to
attroct banks.’ Elec. Payment
Sen’s., 59 Fed. keg. 24,711,
24,72D.
“See BuyPass ficp. mc New York
Switch Corp., No. 93-CV-32D1
(ED. Pa. filed June 15, 1993).
The rule lund survived a private
antitrust challenge, when PM(
acquired Cashstream in 1988.
See The Treasurer, Inc mc
Philodelphio NotionalBank,
682 F. Supp. 269, 28D
(D.N.J.) (upholding exclusivity
pravisions which “were and are
intended to structure [the own-
er’si distcibuton of network
services, ond to provide a
return.., far developing, main-
taining and promoting the net-
work and to prevent free riding
by competitors),’ off’d nem.,
853 12d 921 (3d fir. 1988).
Df course, in 1988, At~C had
far less significant competitive
presence than it did in 1994.
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“A royalty fee requires the ATM
owner to pay a fee to the net-
work for each tronsactan it
chose to route through an
olternatve network.
“See Public Comments an
Proposed Final Judgment,
Electronic Payment Services,
59 Fed. Reg. 44,757 (Aug.
3D, 1994).
“See footnotes 6T69 and
nccomponying text.
“First Data Corp., FTC File Na.
951-DiD! (Sept. 21, 1995).
The FTC brought on earlier
action against First Data in
August 1994, when it intended
to bid on the assets of Western
Unian in o bankruptcy court
auction. First Financial was the
successful bidder and the FTC’s
settlement was never made
final. First Data Carp., FTC File
Na. 931-DD9D (Aug. 18,
1994).
“Consumer money transfer
services involve the tronsfer
between twa parties af funds
through consumer money trans-
fer agents, typically check
casluirrg, private postal, or grocery
stores. Customers wishing to
tronsfer money today begin the
process by going to a consumer
money transfer agent, such as
o check rasher or grocery store,
and completing a transuctian
form, which includes an expla-
nation of how the recipient will
identify himself ar herself when
receiving the rash. The sender
then gives the agent the
money to be tronsferred mud
from participating in other ATM networks.
In turn, MAC’s rules made it substantially
more difficult for other networks to enter
into MAC’s area of dominance, thereby
excluding competitors and maintaining
MAC’s monopoly position.
The division allegedthat regional ATM
network access and ATM processing were
separate products and that MAC’s rules
and practices effectively’ forced its
customers to purchase ATM processing
from MAC. The monopolization claim
alleged that MAC “w-illfully has
maintained its monopoly power in the
market for regionalATM network access in
the affected states through exclusionary
practices,” including its processing rule.
The consent decree requires MAC to
open its network to independent ATM
processors on a nondiscriminatory basis.
MAC is prohibited from tying the use of its
trademark to the purchase of processing
services. Under it, MAC must permit its
participants to use third-party providers of
ATM processing, to display multiple
network trademarks on all their ATMs,
and to permit multiple branding of ATM
cards issued by MAC members in areas
where MAC has or could soon have
unarket power.
The objective of the decree is to
provide banks with the opportunity to use
other networks or third-party processors
for their processing services. MAC is also
required to sell its network services -‘at
prices that will not varywith the process
selected” and to provide a more open envi-
ronment for third-party processors. In
addition, MAC would he limited in the
extent to which it can keep banks from
displaying symbols of other ATM networks
on their ATMs and ATM cards.
The decree perunirs a wide range of
other activities that may’ raise exclusionary’
concerns. First, MAC is permitted to
charge a royalty fee for transactions
processed outside the MAC switch.” This
royalty fee canhc as much as the fee for a
transaction processed through the MAC
switch. Second, MAC can prohibit its
members from hy’passing the switch, a
practice known as subswicching. Third,
MAC is permitted to provide volume
discounts, but these must be provided on a
nondiscriminatory basis.
Whether the decree adequately solved
the competitive problem is an open ques-
tion. The consent decree received a
tremendous amount of adverse commentary;
many competingnetworks stated that the
proposed decree would permit MAC to
achieve the same objective through a
variety of other types of exclusionary con-
duct.” In addition, as described later, the
Board staff raised concerns over the suffi-
ciency of the relief when it examined the
EPS-National CityBank merger.”
The division’s enforcement action
demonstrated that the economics of ubiquity
no longer rule the day The division was
able to do that by separating ATM services
into two separate product markets: ATM
processing (or the back office operations)
and branded regional ATM access (which
reflects the value of membership in the
network and the network mark). As the
division observed, ATM processing can be
provided as a service distinct from branded
ATM network access and can he perforuned
in the facilities of the ATM switch, a
depositor)’ institution’s own facilities, or
in the facilities of a data processing
service organization.
Of course the irony here is that had
the division not signed on to the
economics ofubiquity’ bandwagon, and
had examined the nature of network coun-
petition more carefully it may have
challenged the earlier acquisitions by
MAC, and ultimately this enforcement
action ma)’ have been unnecessary
Payment systems merger challenge—
consumer money transfer services. The
only enforcement action brought against a
payment systems merger was the challenge
by the l’ederal Trade Commission (FTC)
to the acquisition of the Western Union
consumer unoney transfer system (owned
by First i’inancial Management Corp.) by
First Data Corp., the owner of the Money-
Gram svstem—in re First Deco Corp. (First
Data).” Consumer wire money transfer
systems involve one-way’ money transfers,
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typically between two consumers.” Wire
transfer agents include a wide variety of
retail outlets including grocery stores and
check cashing outlets.
Western Union has been the dominant
firm in the market and had been a regulated
monopoly until the late I 970s. The
Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) had deregulated Western Union
based on the expectation that technological
advancement had reduced the baa-riers to
entry” Those expectations were overly
generous; entry was neither easy
nor timely
In the mid-1980s, Citibank attempted
to enter the market, hut their entry
was stifled by two factors: (1) developing
a minimuun viable scale nationwide
network of money transfer agents; and
(2) establishing name recognition and cus-
tomer acceptance ofits services through
large-scale advertising and promotion.
Long-term agent contracts used by
Western Union made acquiringa sufficient
agent network difficult. To build brand
name recognition, substantial investment
would be required over several years.
Citibank’s attempted entry failed after sev-
eral years of significant losses.”
MoneyGram, which was originally
owned by American Express, entered in
the late l980s. It was able to overcome
these barriers in partbecause it could rely
on the trade name and the agent base of
American Express. After several years of
losses, MoneyGram overcaune the harriers
to entry and introduced competition into
an environment in which a monopolist
had dictated annual priceincreases.
Competition from MoneyGram led to
lower prices, better services, and higher
commissions for agents. Prior to Money-
Gram’s entry Western Union imposed
regular annual price increases of 5 percent
to 8 percent. MoneyGram entered by’ com-
peting aggressively on price; Western
Union responded by’ iefraining froun price
increases and offering special promotions
and discounts to customers.” In 1994,
MoneyGram launched a frequent userdis-
count program to increase sales and
customer loyalty; Western Union
responded with a similar program. Non-
price competition increased, including
increased priceadvertising, the development
of a more extensive will-call system, and
free long-distance telephone calls.
Competition between the two
networks also led to almost a threefold
increase in wire transfer agents, which pro-
vided consumers with a dramatic increase
of convenience when using money transfer
services. As both networks competed for
agents, agent commissions increased, the
networks provided greater amounts of
cash at more agent locations, and the
networks increased their advertising.
Competition created these consumer
benefits indirectly by pushing the compa-
nies to pay their transfer agents higher
commissions and significant bonuses for
increasing customer volume.
At the time of the FTC’s action,
Western Union had approximately a
90 percent market share. According to the
complaint, MoneyGram and Western
Union were the only two services in the
U.S. consumer money transfer market and
it would he difficult for new companies to
enter the market, The complaint noted
that First Data’s acquisition ofWestern
Union would create a monopoly in the
market. Further, the FTC contended that
entry was unlikely because of the difficulty
of gaining brand name recognition and
establishing a nationwide network of retail
outlets. Thus absent the settlement, the
FTC alleged that the acquisition would
increase the likelihood that, among other
things, consumers would be forced to pay
higher fees and receive less service and
agents would be forced to accept
reduced coununissions.
The proposed consent agreement per-
mits First Data to acquire Western Unioam
as long as it divests either the MoneyGram
or Western Union consumer money wire
transfer business. The divestiture package
includes the MoneyGram or Western
Union trade name, contracts \vith a
sufficient numher of retail sales agents to
have a minimum viable scale network, and
enough other necessary’ assets to run
the husiness. The settlement also includes
pays the transaction fee. The
transferring agent then inputs
the information into the data
base by computer (or by calling
the service supplier, who inputs
the information). This data-
base allows the receiving cus-
tomer to go to any receiving
ogent in that service’s agent
network and obtain the cash
with proof of identity.
A large portion of consumer
money transfer users do not
have banking relationships;
they accountfor 2D percent to
25 percent of U.S. households.
For those consumers with limited
or nonexistent banking relation-
ships, consumer money
transfers offer the only means
to tronsfer money quickly from
one person ta another.
“See Graphnet Systems, Inc.,
71 F.C.C. 2d 471,515
(1979) (FCC observed that,
‘We are confident that the
public will be served by enabling
multiple entry into this
market.’).
“See ‘Citicorp Express” (1987).
“ When First Data entered, it
priced domestic transfers of
S3DD or lesson $9; ot the
time western Union prrcei
these tronsiers at between
$13 and $29. Western Union
brought an antitrust suit charging
that First Data’s pricing was
predatory. The suit was unsuc-
cessful. See Western Union
Financial Services mc First
Data Carp., 2D Cal. App. 4th
153D (1993).
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“15 U.S.C. § 18(1988).
Notional Boncard Carp.
(‘Nailanco”) v. VISA U.S.A.,
Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231,
1258 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d,
779 F.2d 592(11th Cir.), cect.
denied, 479 U.S. 923
(1986). Baxter (1977)
argued that ‘no significant
degree of market power’ will
exist in that strotum of commu-
nities serviced by only one on-
line system because ‘tIre
preexisting technology,” defined
to include ‘currency, checks,
off-line credit cards and check
guarantee cords subfect to floor
limits,” ‘will constrain pricing
freedom and service quality.’
The Wailanca analysis is criti-
cized in a recent article. See
Carlton and Frankel (1995).
It, however, was adapted by a
recent district court decision
involving ATM network fee set-
ting. See Southtrust Corp. mc





682 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.J.),
off’dmem., 853 E2d 921 (3d
Cir. 1988)
“ 682 F. Supp. at 279 (empha-
sis in original).





Board observed that the prod-
uct market was ‘the provision
to unaffiliated financial institu-
tions of data processing ser-
vices, particularly the operation
of an ATM network exchange”;
Interstate Finonciol Carp.
(1983) (same).
In other orders, it defined the
markets more narrawly. For
example, see Citicorp (1986)
(‘provision of ATM services’);
Sovran Financial Carp. (1986)
various provisions designed to ensure that
therewould be an agent network sufficient
to support the divested business. Finally
the settlement expressly permits First Data
to provide data processing services to the
acquirer of the MoneyGram or the Western
Union assets, provided that First Data,
among other things, shields any nonpublic
information it receives from any First Data
employees who are involved in First Data’s
consumer money wire transfer.
The importance of the First Data
action was in differentiating between the
importance of the back office or systems
operation, and the agent network and
trade name. Like che FCC, the FTC did
not contend that the back office operation
posed an entry barrier. However, the years
of experience gained since the FCC
decision had shown that ease of entry at
the back office level would not guarantee a
competitive market. Thus the proposed
consent orderdoes not require the divesti-
ture of the back office system and in fact
permits First Data to provide back office
services to the acquirer of the divested
assets. Rather, the FTC focused its relief
on the trade name and agent network,
which it contended were the most signifi-




Antitrust analysis examines the effects
of mergers on competition. The purpose
of this analysis is to determine whether the
effect ofan acquisition “may he stnhstantially
to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly” Such analysis involves iden-
tifying the relevant product sold by the
firms and the geographic scope of markets
in which they sell their products. This
section discusses the nature of defining
markets and assessing market power for
payment systems.
Market Deflru’tIon Issues
Antitrust analysis ofpayment system
mergers or other competitive activity
depends critically on whether the system
has market power. This is typically a diffi-
cult question to answer in part because the
delineation of relevant markets is itself a
complex and uncertain undertaking. The
definition of the relevant market has both
product and geographic market
components. Tnboth respects, the markets
defined have become more precise and
narrow over time.
Product market definition. One of
the uncertainties in counseling payment
systems is traceable to the difficulties
in defining the relevant product market
for purposes of measuring market
power. Many different approaches
havebeen used. Product market definition
has become more precise as regulators
have become more sensitive to the
competitive problems raised by network
competition. Tn particular, both the
division and the Board have begun to dif-
ferentiate between the back office and
trademark aspects of a network in defining
the market. Typically factfinders define
the product market from the perspective of
the cardholder (the retail market) and the
card issuing bank (the wholesale market).
A payment systems market. One of
the earliest cases, NaBanca, involved
a challenge to a credit card interchange
fee. The district court defined a broad
retail market consisting of all payment
systems, which it defined further as:
a market consisting of VISA
and all payment services used
in retail sales. This market
includes VISA, MasterCard,
T & E cards, merchants’
proprietary cards, merchants’
open book credit, cash,
travelers cheques, ATM cards,
personal checks and check
guarantee cards.”
The court acknowledged that none of
these was a perfect substitute hut relied on
an exannination of cross-elasticities of
supply and demand to determine that they
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weresufficiently close substitutes for the
VISA card.
A data processing market. Interms of a
wholesale market, in early casesfact
finders emphasized the data processing
functions of ATM networks. For example,
in The Treasurer, the district courtadopted
abroad definition of the relevantproduct
market.” That caseinvolved a challenge
by The TreasurerATM network in New
Jersey to the acquisition ofthe Cashstream
networkby Philadelphia National Bank,
the owner and operatorofthe MAC
network. Although he ultimately
dismissed the case for lack ofantitrust
injury Judge Politanalso examined the
case on themerits. In so doing, he defined
therelevant product market as “electronic
data processing to all AIMs plus all of
those institutionsthat haveunaffiliated
ATM systems and those institutionsthat
donot currently have AIMs but have the
capacityto install themand use market
technology to its fullest.”M In otherwords,
the market included all finns capable of
performing the electroniccommunication
function performed by an ATM network.
Similarly, in the 1980s, in orders
approvingbank holding companies’ acqui-
sitionsof voting stock in sharedEfi
networks, the Federal Reserve Boardtypi-
cally defined the relevant market as “the
provision ofdata processing services to
unaffihiated financial institutions.”” In
addition, the Board noted that the market
for data processing and related ATM
services is “unconcentrated,withmany
competitorsand few barriers to entry”M
An ATM services and network switching
market. Inmore recent decisionsand
enforcement actions, fact finders have
defined more narrow markets, focusing
primarily on demandside factors. For
example, in the Financial Interchangearbi-
tration, which involved ATM network
interchange fees, the arbitrator rejected
proposed markets ofallpayment systems
and all means ofobtaining cash, similar to
the approach takenby the Boardand the
courts in NaBanco or The Treasurer.
Instead,it identified a narrow retail market
of “ATM services” on the grounds “that
there is a significant group ofATM users
who value the characteristicsof ATMs and
for whom othermeansofobtaining cash
are not reasonable substitutes.”7
In addition, in Financial Interchange,
thearbitrator identified awholesale
market for network switching, and
concludedthat PULSE had market power
because “existing subnetworks, regional
networks and national networks do not
presently provide a reasonable substitute
for the [switchingi service PULSE provides
to its members.””
In theEPS consent decree, the
antitrustdivision tooka similar approach,
albeit focusing onthe wholesale side of the
market.’~First, itdefined amarket for
regional ATMservice, basedon the needs
ofbanks to provide depositors “ubiquitous
access to theiraccounts.” Itobservedthat
“while a bank candeploy its ownATMs,
the advantage to a sharedATM networkis
thatabanksdepositors will beable to use
ATMs at manymore locations thanone
bankalone could practicablysupport. The
areas a bankseeks to serve througha
shared ATM network include the areas in
which its depositors live, work and shop,
and the broader areas in which they move
regularly. Abanksability to offer its
depositors access to other banks’ ATMs,
and thereby to offer its depositors
convenient accessto their accounts, is in
most bankers’view necessaryto attract
and retain deposits.... Because no other
service constitutes a reasonably closesub-
stitute for regional ATM networkaccess,
regional ATM networks constitutes a
productmarket.”’°
Similarly it defined a second market
for ATM processing. This market
involvesproviding the data processing
services and telecommunicationsfacilities
and services used in providing regional
ATM access.4’
Network access, network services, and ATM
processing. In its analysis of the EPS-
National CityBank merger (hereinafter
Bane One Corp.), the Federal Reserve
(sowe); lideys Bwk PLC
(1985) rcmi,effiifl
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92 Banc One Carp. (1995), pp.
491, 494.
See NoBanco, 596 F Supp. at
1259 (where the panics
ogreed thotthe market was
nationwide); see alsa
Complaint, ‘]fl] 77-80 in New
York v. VISA USA., Inc., Na.
89{iw5043 (S.D.N.Y. July
26, 1939) (the states alleged
a nabanwide morket for credit
cards and point of sole debit
cards marketed by nananal
]ointventure).
See Financial Interchange, 55
Trade keg. Rep. (BNA), No,
1380, pp. 356 (although the
geogrophic boundaries of the
retail market were not directly
addressed in this proceeding,
retail markets are presumably
local because consumers will
use only ATMs close to where
they are).
See fPScarrsent decree, 59
Federal Register 24,711; Boor
One Corp. (1995), pp. 494.
See Mchndrews and Kauffman
(1993).
Banc One Corp. (1995),
p.494.
Board further refined the division
approach by defining three markets:
(1) network access (access to an ATM
network identified by a common
trademark or logo displayed on AIMs and
ATM cards); (2) network services (the
switching functions for the network); and
(3) ATM processing (the data processing
and telecommunications facilities used
to operate, monitor, and support a
hank~ ATMs).42
According to the Board, network access
includes: (1) the right to brand ATMs and
ATM cards with the trademark or logo of
the ATM network; (2) the ability of the
ATM cardholder with an account at one
member depositor)’ institution to initiate
withdrawal arid other account transactions
at an ATM owned by another depository
institution that is a member of the same
network; and (3) minimum standards for
network performance and products offered
through the network.
Similarly the Board defined network
services as including the switching
functions performed by the ATM switch
and gateway services with other networks.
Finally the Board defined ATM processing
as including the provision of terminal dri-
ving, transaction routing and authorization,
and account reconciliation services.
An obsen’cuion. How a fact finder analyzes
the relevant product market in cases
involving hank networks depends in part
on how much weight is accorded to the
value of the network trademark. If one
looks only to the data processing function
of shared ATM networks, it may be
plausible to conclude, as did the frcastircr
court, that the data processing industry is
unconcentrated, that there are numerous
alternatives available to financial
institutions to perfortn their data
processing, and that a network—even a
dominant regional network—does not
have market power. On the other hand, if
the network is viewednot so much as a
vendor of undifferentiated data processing
services, hut rather as the purveyor of a
unique branded product marketed under
the network logo, the fact finder may reach
a very different conclusion, as in Bane One
Corp. or Financial Interchange.
In this respect, the Board’s decision in
Bane One Corp. is a significant analytical
advancement. By identifying a “network
access” market which focuses on the
“branded product” aspect of the network,
the Board’s decision provides a mechanism
for more careful and precise analysis of
market po\ver.
Geographic market definition. The geo-
graphic market can be defined only with
reference to a specific product or service
market, and there are uncertainties here as
well. Markets have been defined as
national, regional. or local depending on
the product market selected.
For example, early court opinions that
addressed the geographic market applicable
to a payment systems market suggested
that it is national:” If the focus of a fact
finder is a product market defined in terms
of data processing for unaffiliaced institu-
tions or network switching services, the
geographic market should be national
because those services are generally
provided on a national basis. On the other
hand, in cases such as Financial Interchange,
whoch focused on a retail market. the geo-
graphic market was assumed to be local
in scope.~
The most recent decisions have
defined ATM networks as participating in
regional markets~’In Bane One Corp., the
Board observed that most networks were
regional in scope (that is, consisting of
several states), and a Federal Reserve
study found that the markets for ATM
network access were at least regional.’~
The Board decided that the appropriate
geographic market in which to analyze
the competitive effects of the merger
was MAC~ Mideast Region (western
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky
and West Virginia), where National City
had a competitive presence.
In Bane One Corp., the Board also
seems to suggest that in some cases the
geographic market may he national in
scopei The Board observed that compa-
nies are able to provide A[M processing
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and network services through data
processing facilities regardless of
geographic proximity and that some
firms provide these services on a
nationwide basis.
One issue that arises in ATM cases is
~5~hether national ATM networks (for
example, PLUS and CIRRUS) compete
with regional networks, In the Financial
Interchange arbitration, the arbitrator held
that national ATM networks did not
provide an adequate alternative to PULSE
because neither could duplicate the
coverage of the PULSE network. The
antitrust division in the EPS consent
decree has taken a skeptical position about
the level of competition offered by national
networks. In its Competitive Impact State-
ment it observed the following:
National ATM networks exist, but
these are by design networhs of last
resort, used only where the two
banks involved in a transaction do
not both belong to any one regional
ATM network. National ATM net-
work transactions are typically more
expensive, and those networks pro-
vide only a subset of the transactions
available through regional ATM
networks 48
Meosun’na Market Power
There is relatively little guidance as
to what statistical baseshould be used
as a surrogate for measuring the power
of a particular network. In Financial Inter-
change, the arbitrator variotosly examined
the share of all ATM transactions (which
“understate]d the venture~]position in the
market”), the share of interprocessor
switching transactions, the share of avail-
able AIMs, and the cardholder base.~’
In The Treasureo; Inc. rc Philadelphia
Nat’l Bank, thecourt suggested that market
power should be measured by the nunuher
of AIMs.” it wrote that “the principal
competitive advantage of any ATM
network is the number of AIMs utilized by
the systean.” The court also examined
financial institution deposits in holding
that measurement of the market cannot
be confined to network ATMs, but must
take account of the large number of
unaffihated ATMs that are open territory
for competition.”
Other possible measures for assessing
market power include the number of ATM
locations (as distinct from number of ATM
machines), the value of ATM transactions
(as distinct from number of transactions),
the number of member institutions, and
the value of retail deposits accessible by
ATM. The interpretation of any statistical
measure must be tempered by the
recognition that ATMs, cardholders, and
institutions may have simultaneous access
to multiple networks. Ultimately, in the
bank network context, statistical anarket
share evidence—at least in terms of a share
of ATM transactions—may be an imperfect
measure of market power. Because of the
availability of alternative networks, histor-
ical market share may overstate the market
power of a network. Yet because of the
difficulty competing networks may have
acquiring the necessary critical mass,
market shares may tend to understate
market power. Similarly because of the
significance of entry barriers in the ATM
access market, market shareswill also
understate market power. Thus a fact
finder must exercise caution before relying
on any individual statistical measure.’’
Aria!ysis of Entry Barriers
Essential to the analysis of market
power in payment system cases is consid-
eration of the existence of entry harriers.
Where entry is “easy,” ii. is difficult for a
network to raise prices or reduce output
since that exercise will lead new firms to
enter the market and cease the competitive
opportunity. According to the antitrust
division and the FTC entry is “easy” only
if it would he timely, likely and sufficient
in magnitude to counteract the competitive
effects of concern.
In the network environment analysis
of entry becomes more complex because of
the critical mass nature of networks. .A
“59 Fed. Reg. 24719 (May 12,
19941. The Federai Reserve
Board has taken a similor
pasiflan. Banc One Carp.,
p.494, n.21.
55 Trade Rca. Rep. (BNA), No.
1380, pp. 353, 356.






FIDIRAL RBSSRVE SANK 01 ST. LOUIS
29ll[YIF~
NOVSMBSR/DECFMSSR I 995
(PS, 59 Fed. Reg., p. 24,720.
network may not be able to effectively
enter unless it acquires a sufficient number
of participants to offer a viable product.
This poses a “chicken and egg” problem;
potential members are reluctant tojoin
unless they are assured that a sufficient
nutuher of other firms willjoin to make
the network viable.
Moreover, network externalities may
also impose significant entry barriers.
ATM networks provide an example that
illustrates the difficulty a challenger faces
in duplicating the network externality of
an incumbent firm. ATM networks exhibit
a positive externality: large networks yield
increased convenience to consumers, thus
increasing the network’svalue to the con-
sumer. Thus a new network is unlikely to
succeed unless it can demonstrate that a
substantial number of transactions and
cardholders within the market will be
available on a long-term basis. Effective
entry requires that a new ATM network
offer the same (or better) convenience and
ubiquity offered by the incumbent
network. As the division observed in the
EPS competitive impact statement, in
order to be competitive, a network must
provide “enough of a presence to provide
[their] depositors with sufficient ubiquity
and convenience.””
As in the analysis of relevant product
market, the analysis of entry barriers in the
network context has varied significantly
One approach, which focuses on competi-
tion at the “back office” level, has been to
suggest that entry can be accomplished
relatively easily For example, in The Trea-
surer, the court focused on competition in
providing automated data processing ser-
vices to banks. In this market there were a
number of potential entrants including
third-party processors, regional and
national ATM networks. Ofcourse, The
Treasurer was decided in 1988, in a context
in which there were large nuanbers of
banks that were unaffiliated with any net-
work and in which no network was
dominant. Thus, the potential for a new
network to arise and compete with MAC
was far more significant than it is today
A more sophisticated approach to
analysis of entry was provided by the arbi-
trator in the Financial Interchange matter.
The PULSE network argued that barriers
to entry might not be significant. Faced
with the exercise of market power, PULSE
suggested,individual banks could use
other networks or form their own quasi-
network by bypassing the PULSE network
switch. Although these opportunities for
bypass existed, the arbitrator suggested
that entry barriers were significantbecause
of both network externality and critical
mass factors. Although there was the
opportunity for the formation of smaller
networks through individual bypass between
member banks, this was insufficient to
alleviate the concern over market power.
Expert testimony established that a new
ATM network could not succeed without
providing consumers a level of convenience
comparable with that of the PULSE
network. The arbitrator found that a new
network could not support the number of
AIMs required to furnish such convenience
without achieving “major defections” from
PULSE, and that such defections were
unlikely. These findings ultituately led the
arbitrator to conclude that the PULSE net-
work did have market power, even though
the complainants could have bypassed
PULSE and created their own local network.
Analysis of entry harriers is essential
to determining whether networks have the
ability to exercise market power. This
analysis should focus on whether potential
entrants have the ability to attract a
sufficient number of firms tojoin a new
network and whether that network has the
ability to deter the exercise of market
power. This analysis should focus on
competition at the brand or ATM access
level,where network externalities and crit-
ical mass play an important role.
/TEM NETWORK MEROEfl—.~~
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Since the mid-1980s tremendous con-
solidation among ATM networks has
occurred. The number ofregional ATM
networks has been reduced substantially
and in relatively few areas is there head-to-
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head competition between networks.
Some commentators have predicted there
may be as few as 10 regional networks by
the end of the century” In this section,
we discuss the legal framework for
analyzing ATM network mergers.
il-re reqw l~rnni,a,I,c.~ne
Mergers and acquisitions of ATM net-
works may be challenged under either the
Sherman Act or the Clayton Act by the
division, state attorneys general, or private
parties. To prevail, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the merger or acquisition
may have a significant adverse effect on
competition, and this, in turn, requires the
plaintiff to prove a relevant product and
geographic market. In addition, a private
party unlike the government, must also
prove that the challenged merger or acqui-
sition will cause it to suffer antitrust
injury Where the private-party plaintiff is
a competitor of the merging parties, this
will be a difficult burden to satisfy because
the plaintiff must demonstrate that it will
be injured by higher prices charged by the
merging parties.”
Mergers and acquisitions between
ATM networks nnay also require regulatory
approval. Thus, for example, where the
network’s shareholders are bank holding
companies, the shareholders typically
nnust receive the approval of the iederal
Reserve Board (or the relevant Federal
Reserve Bank) before acquiring another
network.” The parties to a network acqui-
sition may also he required to file
notification with the FTC and the antitrust
division under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,
although the size of anost network acquisi-
tions and the parties making them will
usually he below the size thresholds.
Other exemptions may also apply under
certain circumstances.’”
To date, there have not been any chal-
lenges to ATM network mergers by the
division, and the Board has declined to
stop any mergers. The only decided case
involved a private challenge to a regional
ATM network merger. In 1988. The Trea-
surernetwork sought a preliminary
injunction to stop the acquisition of the
Cashstream network by Philadelphia
National Bank, which operated the MAC
Network.’” The court dismissed the suit
on the grounds that the plaintiff had
suffered no antitrust injury as required
under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act
and hence lacked standing to sue. After
the acquisition, MAC also acquired
The Treasurer
—~ ~ ““ ~
Both the antitrust division and the
Federal Reserve Board have given renewed
attention to ATM network mergers.
Reportedly both agencies have investigated
the NYCE-Yankee 24 and the EPS-National
City Bank mergers (discussed later), hut
neither has taken any enforcement action.’”
Enforcement officials at the division
have provided some guidance about their
new interest in ATM network mergers.
The division no longer adheres to the cate-
chistn of economics of ubiquity and is now
subjecting ATM anergers to much greater
scrutiny Robert Litan, the former antitrust
division deputy assistant attorney general,
said that the division is revisiting the
assumption of economics of ubiquity”
F1e suggested that the division is not
convinced that ATM networks are
natural monopolies. Rather than taking a
doctrinal view in favor of ATM mergers,
titan suggested that these mergers will
receive greater scrutiny and that the
networks would carry a significant burden
of proof. He also observed that the
procompetitive benefits of mergers might
he acquired through less restrictive
alternatives: “Ii] ti svery possible that they
can achieve the same economies of scale
without going to full-scale mergers.”
The EPS consent decree suggests how
the division is likely to consider some
issues that arise in ATM network mergers.
First, defining the product market is the
first step in merger analysis. In EPS, the
division identified separate markets for
ATM processing and Regional ATM access.
Thus the division will look at the competi-
“See The Bankers Raundtable
(1994).
“See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bawl~O -Mat Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977); Car/IL Inc
Manfartof Colorado. Inc.,
479 U.S. 104 (1986).
“See 12 U.S.C. 1843 (1988);
12 C.FR. Parts 225.21-25
(1994).
“See 15 U.S.C. 1 Ba (1988);




682 F Sapp. 269 (D.N.J.),
aff’drnern., 853 F2d 921
(3d Cir. 1988).
“See Bank ol New York Ca.
(1994) appraving merger of
Yankee 24 and NYCF; Baac
One Carp. (1995) appraving
merger of FPS and National
City Bank.
“See “Bank, AIM Mergers’
(1994), p.2.
Id.
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“59 Fed. Req. 24712 (May 12,
1994).
“Bank af New Yark Ca. (1994).
Id.
tive effects of mergers in both markets.
The ATM network access market is likely
to raise more competitive issues because
some competitors, including third-party
processors, do not provide effective alter-
natives in that market.
Second, apparently the only competi-
tive alternatives in the ATM network
access market are regional networks. Thus
arguments that other types of networks or
processors offer competitive alternatives
may not succeed. In particular, national
networks, although they offer a degree of
coverage comparable to regional networks,
are unlikely to be seen as competitive
alternatives. The Competitive Impact
Statement in the EPS case noted that
national ATM networks are “by design net-
works of the last resort.”””
Finally exclusivityrules, such as those
challenged in the EPS case will he an impor-
tant part of the analysis; these rules may
prevent the entry of alternative networks
into the market. Ifmany of the available
banks are committed to long-term exclusive
dealing arrangementswith a dominant
network, an alternative ATM network may
be unable to acquire the critical mass of
banks necessary to achieve a minimum
viable scale. Where these rules are present,
antitrust enforcers should be especially
viligant to ensure that the merger will not
prevent the entry of competing networks.
RECENT ATM MERGER
OEC1SfONS—REPAVlNG
THE ROAD E.G REGiONAL
MONOPOLY
The remainder of this articleaddresses
the decisions of the Federal Reserve Board
in two recent mergers—Yankee 24-NYCL
and EPS-National City Bank and the impli-
cations of those decisions for future
network competition.
Ya.nkee 24-NUT
A recent network merger that received
a greatdeal of scrutiny by both the Board
and the division was the merger of the
NYCE and Yankee 24.’” NYCE was the
third largest network in the United States
with 95 million transactions monthly
more than 13,000 ATMs and a dominant
position in New York. Yankee 24 was the
ninth largest network, with 23 million
transactions and more than 4,000 ATMs,
and competed throughout New England.
Both networks competed in parts of New
England, primarily in Massachusetts
and Connecticut.
Even though there was direct competi-
tion between the two networks, it did not
receive a great deal of attention in the
Boarchv decision. The Board did not
address the nature of the head-to-head
competition between the networks or its
significance. In approving the merger, the
Board did not appear to believe that the
loss of competition between the two
networks would be significant. It observed
that “anumber of factors should mitigate
the loss of Yankee 24.. .asan independent
competitor.”” ln particular, the Board
observed that other providers of FF1 ser-
vices would remain in the market, including
third-party processors and other regional
and national ATM and POS networks.
Further analysis of the nature of coa’n-
petition would have been useful. For
example, the Board did not discuss or
identify the nature of competition between
the two networks. Its observations on
competitive alternatives also deserved elab-
oration. Although third-papty processors
offer competition in the ATM processing
market, they do not compete in either the
network access or network services mnarket.s.
The only other regional network in the
market, MAC, had a coanpetitive presence
only in New Hampshire. The competitive
significance of national networks is limited,
as noted in the El’s decree. Thus the Board’s
reasons for finding there was no significant.
loss of cotnpetition seem open to question.
The most interesting aspects of the
order were not the observations about the
level of current competition, but rather
what the Board had to say about the
merged networks commitment to an open
network structure, the existence of poten-
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tial efficiencies and how these factorsjusti-
fied the loss of competition.
Operating rules—the importance of an
open network structure. The critical
factor from the Board’s perspective was the
new operating rules offered by the
network, which permitted all non-equity
members to bypass the network and enter
into arrangements with alternative
networks or third-party processors. The
network’s operating rules permit: (1)
third-party processors to participate in the
network; (2) members to participate in
other networks; (3) card issuers to
determine routing; and (4) institutions to
participate on a nondiscriminatory basis.
The first and second of these rules
provide member banks with possible alter-
natives, including processing from third
parties and ATM switching services from
other networks. The third and fourth
rules provide mechanisms by which small
institutions can enhance their ability to
obtain competitively priced services from
the network. Of particular importance
may be the card-issuerrouting rule, which
would permit banks to choose lower cost
networks if the merged network attempted
to raise prices.’”
Efficiencies. The Board also found that
the merger would result in public benefits
that outweighed any loss of competition.
These were primarily in economies of
scope and reduced costs, including:
(1) increased transaction volume, which
would increase economies of scale and
reduce costs (primarily in transaction pro-
cessing); (2) increased ability to offer POS
services to retailers; and (3) increased con-
sumer convenience.
Benc One Ccn-e,----The EPS-NB,tk,nai’
Oty Bank Merger
Sometimes networks expand by admit-
ting new financial institutions in adjacent
areas as owners. One such merger that
received a lot of scrutiny by the Federal
Reserve Board was the application to admit
National City Bank of Ohio as an owner of
EPS; the Board approved the application in
a 5-1 vote in March 1995.”
Compared with a merger of a
neighboring networks, adding new owners
may he a preferable (and less expensive)
method of expanding geographically
Antitrust enforcers, however, should treat
these transactions as mergers because in
many cases they may result in the diminu-
tion of competition between the two
networks. For example, if the expanding
network has some sort of exclusivity
arrangement (either dejtrre or dejacto), the
transfer of one institution’s ATNs could
drive the neighboring network below the
minimum efficient scale needed to operate.
Once the neighboring network is driven
below aninimum efficient scale, its compet-
itive significance will cease. In other
words, the net result could be the same as
a merger.
National City Bank ftCB) sought to
join EPS as a 20 percent equity member
and in turn, FPS would acquire National
City’s branded ATM network (Money
Center), which operates in Ohio, Indiana,
and Kentucky (ithas just under 900
ATMs). NCB was a member of Money Sta-
tion, a neighboring joint venture ATM in
Ohio. Money Station filed a protest. The
Board staff considered the application for
several months, received several pleadings
from the parties, and conducted an
informal meeting.
The loss of competition. Money Station
claimed that the acquisition would
eliminate actualand potential competition
and would increase the barriers to entry or
expansion by existing or potential ATM
networks. NCB was one of Money
Station’s largestmembers. By acquiring
Money Station, EPS would have a substan-
tial share of AIMs in several Ohio
markets, including Cleveland and
Columbus. In Money Station’s view by
permitting the acquisition, NCB would he
eliminated as an actual or potential
competitor because as an equity owner
of EPS, it would have no incentive to
participate in alternative networks. In
addition, the merger would increase the
“Fart discassian of the inpar-
tanre of rar&issuer roufing
rules, see Grimm and lolta
(19931.
Banc One Carp. (Marth 6,
1995) (Vice Chairman Alan
Blinder dissentingl.
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“Letter from Stephen A.
Rhaodes, Assistant Dirertar,
Division of Research and
Statistics, to Allen Raiken, et al.
(Feb. 15, 1995).
“The Board’s understanding of
the purpose of consent decrees
appears mistaken. The purpose
ofthe decree is to remedy the
conpeflflve problem at tIme
time the decree is entered,
nat daring the pendency of
the decree.
difficulty for existing or potential
competing ATM networks to retain or
assemble the necessary critical mass of
terminals and cardholders required by eco-
nomic considerations, such as economies
of scale and ubiquity to be effective
competitors of MAC.
The Board rejected the argument
because the facts of record did not
support the view that NCB would be par-
ticularly likely to enter the market
independently or through another joint
venture in competition with MAC if this
proposal were denied. Of particular
importance was that NCB abandoned
its attempts to form a new regional ATM
network with other largebanking organi-
zations in 1992 and instead became a
participating member of the MAC
network. NCB also ceased offering
ATM processing services to unaffiliated
third parties thus the loss of actual compe-
tition in network services was minimal.
Thus in the Board’s view, NCB did not
compete in either the ATM access or
ATM processing markets. In addition,
MAC would remain subject to actual
and potential competition from other
providers of FF1 services. Thus the Board
concluded there was no significant loss
ofcompetition.
Operating rules. The Board relied heavily
on the role the division consent decree
would play in ensuring that the market
remained competitive. In particular, the
Board appeared to believe that by opening
the MAC network to third-party processors,
banks could easily find a competitive alter-
native to MAC. Moreover, the Board held
that these third-party processors could
provide a channel for entry by competing
regional ATM networks.
Money Station contended that various
MAC rules permitted the network to
thwart any procompetitive effects achieved
under the division consent decree. The
Board staff investigated the effects of
four rules: (1) MAC’s prohibition of sub-
switching between members; (2) MAC’s
rights under the consent decree to charge a
royalty fee if subswitching were to he per-
mitted; (3) MAC~ requirement that
national network transactions be routed
through the MAC network; and (4) MAC’s
holding company rule that generally
requires membership of all affiliated
banks. The Board staff specifically asked
the parties what would he the coanpetitive
effect of changing these rules.” Without
securing any evidence, the Board
concluded that modification of these
rules was not necessary (although Vice
Chairman Alan Blinder would have
required the changes). The Board did so
because “the consent decree recently
became effective, and that its terms are
designed to achieve procompetitive effects
over time during the 10-year duration of
the decree.”
Efficiencies/public benefits. The Board
concluded that there were potential public
benefits because NCB would make cash
infusions that would enable FP5 “to
continue and expand its research and
development efforts,” improving its
ability to offer innovative electronic
banking products.
Dissent. Vice Chairman Blinder
dissented. He noted that although the
loss of competition was modest, the
public benefits did not outweigh this
loss of competition. He observed that
the application “demonstrates no such
benefits to the public, in my view,”
as required by Sec. 4(c)(8) of the
Bank Holding Company Act. The
vice chairman would have required
modification of MAC’s operating rules,
apparently as suggested by the staff, to
meet the public benefits test.
A,ssesscnent
The Board’s approach in these
cases is very much a mixed bag. Some
aspects of their decision making appear to
give credence to the opportunities for net-
work competition, yet ultimately they
seem to assume that a regional monopoly
is foreordained.
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Defining the relevant market. Critical to
understanding the analysis of network
mergers is disaggregating the different
dimensions of the network and analyzing
the effect of mergers on competition for
each dimension. A network has several
components, including a trademark, a
computer switch, and operating rules. As
noted earlier, too often enforcers and regu-
lators have focused on the unconcentrated
nature of back office operations, and have
given too little attention to competition at
thebrand level.” Differentiating between
the two is important because there may be
relatively few firms capable of competing
at the brand level. Moreover, the barriers
to entry may he dramatically different in
the hack office or brand level. Similarly
even though there may be efficiencies from
consolidation at the systems level, these
efficiencies may not outweigh the loss of
brand competition.
The most encouraging aspect of the
Boarth decision in Bane One Corp. was
their effort to disaggregate the dimensions
of competition in their analysis of the rele-
vant product market. As noted earlier, the
Board had previously viewedthe relevant
market as basically the networksback
office operations—an unconcentrated
market in which entry harriers would be
relatively trivial.
In Bane One Corp., the Board
recognized the distinction between the
hack office and brand aspectsof competi-
tion. As noted earlier, it defined three
relevant markets: network access, ATM
processing and network services. The last
two markets reflect the value of the back
office operations and the network switch,
respectively The first market reflects the
value of the brand name, reputation, and
agreements between the network and
its members.”
Competitive effect analysis. Critical in
the analysis of any merger is a determina-
tion of the competitive effects of the
merger, that is, what will be the ability of
the merged firm to exercise market power
after the merger. In both Yankee 24 and
Bane One Corp., the Board appeared to rely
on the general structure of the market and
the operating rules (discussed later) in
concluding that anticompetitive effects
were unlikely In both cases the competi-
tive analysis of the Board was rather
limited. Particularly in Yankee 24, where
the two networks had competed directly
in Connecticut and Massachusetts,
an analysis of the impact of that competi-
tion on both banks and consumers
would have been useful. Some relevant
issues, similar to those in First Data,
would have included the impact of network
competition on network fees, fees to
consumers, output (in terms ofATMs and
transactions), advertising, and revenue to
hank members.
Another important issue in Bane One
Corp. was whether NCB’s incentives in
participating in alternative networks
would he altered because of hecoaning an
equity owner of EPS. If NCB’s incentives
were altered and it dedicated its ATMs
exclusively to MAC, Money Station might
fall below minimum viable scale and its
competitive viability might he in doubt.
The Board concluded that this concern
was “too speculative at this time torepre-
sent a significant potential adverse effect,”
because MAC no longer required
exclusively for its members.
The Board’s analysis of the likelihood
of defaeto exclusivitymay be deficient
by failing to recognize how NCB’s owner-
ship interests in EPS would affect its
incentives. NCB has no ownership in
Money Station. As an owner of EPS, it
is in NCB’s interest to direct as many
transactions as possible through MAC.
Thus it seems simple to predict that the
likely outcome is that NCB will dedicate
its transactions to the network that will
enhance its revenue. That a financial
interest can create defaeto exclusivity
has been recognized by the division
and the FTC in several recent cases
in nonbanking markets and in
the recently issued Health Care
Policy Statements.”
The importance ofnetwork operating
rules. The Board’s approach to the
“See Bokar (1993).
“The bard eaploined that net-
work access includes: (1) the
right to brand ATMs and ATM
cards with the trademark or
logo of the ATM network; (2)
the obility of the ATM cardholder
with an account at one member
depository institution to initiate
withdrawal and other account
transactions at on ATM owned
by another depositary institu-
tion that isa member of the
some network; and (3) mini-
mum standards for network
performance and products
offered through the network.
“Home Oxygen, FTC File Na.
9Ol~OlO9 (Nov. 2,1993) and
Homecore thqgen, FTC File Na.
901-0020 (Nov. 2,1993)
(heolthcare joint ventures were
de lana exclusive; physician
ownership interests deferred
incentive to participate in
competing ventures); U.S.
Deportment of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission,
Statements of Enforcement
Policy and Anolytical Principles
Relating to Heolth Care and
Antitrust (Sept. 27, 1994), at
69-JO (describing factors that
lead to de [onto eaclusivity).
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A suMetwork could be an alter-
native AIM network,
“55 Trade teg. Rep. (BNA), No.
13BO,at353,
“Id.
importance of operating rules seems
confusing. In Yankee 24-NYCE, the
commitment to an open network structure
that permitted anembers to bypass the net-
work and enter into arrangements with
alternative networks or third-party proces-
sors appeared critical to the Board’s
conclusion that there was little potential
for exercise of market power.
Yet in Bane One Corp., the Board
seemed unwilling to fofiow that precedent.
The Board staff appeared concerned that
MAC rules that imposed restrictions on
subswitching between members would
make it difficult for members to bypass the
network. Vice Chairman Blinder would
have preferred that the Board require that
MAC amend these rules. If the Board was
correct in Yankee 24, that would seem the
preferable approach.
Amending network rules may benec-
essary to resolve concerns over the
exercise of market power, but is it
sufficient? Should network rules that
create an open architecture in and of them-
selves immunize a merger where the
merged firm will have market power? Is
the opportunity to form suhnetworks
between individual network members
sufficient to alleviateconcerns about
market power?
The Board is basically sailing on
uncharted waters in this area. The
onE’ case to address the issue, the
Financial Interchange arbitration, did
not provide clear guidance on whether
open architecture would alleviate the
concerns o( market power. (In this case,
the network (PULSE) peranitted its
members to route transactions through
subnetworks) “In determining whether
alternative routing would diminish
the threat of market power, the
arbitrator wrote:
Becatese ATM owners control routing
ofATM transactions, they could
choose in some instnunces to elect to
rotet e transactions within a stthnet—
work. If. for example, the inter-
changefee within the subnetwork is
higher than that of PULSE, the ATM
owner has the incentive to use sub-
network routings if available. The
same could be trtre in reverse if
issuers could control routing. This
competition within the existing
structure could decrease PULSE~
revenue Interprocessorstibnet-
works functioning within the PULSE
system can provide some limit on
PULSE~freedom to establish
interchange fees.”
Nonetheless, the arbitrator discounted the
significance of this open architecture in
part because ofthe universal access offered
by PULSE:
The very fact that all Texas subnet-
works are PULSE members at least
suggests that they perceive the need
for sharing on a broader basis, The
number ofcards andATMs in each of
these networks is far smaller than in
PULSE. Moreovet single processor
‘capability is limited. Even within
local markets such as Dallas or
Houston, the access provided by sub-
networks falls far short of that of
PULSE. Unless cardholders are
indifferent to the added access
PULSE participation provides,
intraprocessor switching is not an
adequate substitute; reliance solely
on such switching woceld place [juan,—
cial instittotions at a significant dis-
nunlvantag The combination of
existing subnetworks might c4 e~u rse
provide nan alternative to PULSE...
but single subnetworlas nas they now
exist are no real snhstiture.”
Ultimately, individual suhnetworks (or
third-party processors) were not a viable
comupetitive alternative because they did
not offer the level of universal access pro-
vided by PULSE. Similarly in Bane One,
although individual third-party processors
might he capable of entering into the area
dominated by MAC, it seems unlikely any
of thetn could provide the level of
universal access provided by MAC. As
important, third-party processors can
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offer competition only at the back office
level; they do not provide competition at
the network access or network services
markets.
Of course, at this stage there is little
evidence that the division consent decree
with MAC has resulted in significant entry
by third-party processors or competing
networks. Even if the consent createdan
open network structure, there are several
reasons why that structure might not
ensure that a network—especially a
dominant network—cannot exercise
muarket power.
Eirst, evenwith an open architecture,
a network might attempt to impose de
facto exclusivity through other types of
rules or fees that raised the costs of
entering into alternative arrangements.
For example, a network could set a “royalty
or bypass fee” that would make using
alternative networks financially unfeasihie.
In addition, other incentives such as o\vn-
ership in the network, may discourage the
use of alternative arrangements.
Ultimately open architecture may be
an illusory solution. If members start to
bypass the network to any significant
extent, free-rider problems will arise; in
turn, members may become increasingly
reluctant to invest in the network. The
net\vork may respond by closing the
net\vork, hanning subswitching or
imposing a fee for hypassed transactions.
For example, a network could impose a fee
on transactions routed outside the
network. These free-riding/routing
disputes are some of the most contentiotms
in the ATM area.”
The Board’s failure to address the oper-
ating rules in Bane One Corp. sends a
confusing message to ATM networks. If
these rules are important to reducing the
likelihood of the exercise of market power,
they should he imposed where that threat
is present. But even ifthe Board believes
that operating rules can remedy the threat
of anarket power, relying on this factor is at
best a second-rate solution. Ifoperating
rules are important, a preferable position
might be that taken by the states in
Entree—to prevent the merger and permit
the networks to compete in terms of oper-
ating rules. Moreover, approving mergers
hased on operating rules will place the Board
in the position of increasingly regulating
these networks and eventually arbitrating
the intranetwork disputes over these rules.
The importance of efficiencies/network
externalities. In merger cases, the
enforcement agencies evaluate whether the
efficiencies that may arise from a merger
may outweigh the potential for competitive
harm. Prominent in network merger cases
are argumnents that efficiencies in terms of
network externalities will outweigh any
competitive harm. Network externalities
reflect the view that the value of a network
to a consumer depends on the number of
users and the identities of specific users.
The larger the network, the greater the
number of consumers who will join it,
and, conversely the smaller the network,
the fewer the number of consumers who
will join it. Network externalities are
especially common in electronic networks
such as payment systenms.”
In Bane One Corp.. the Board
recognized the importance of network
externalities. It observed that.:
as an ATM network expands the
numberofitsfinancial institution
members and available ATMs, its
value to network cardholnlers
increases due to the greateraccessi-
bility o~ their deposit accounts.
Similarly as the number of cnerdholnl—
ers increases, so will the number of
transactions and hence the economic
return on ATM terminals nleployed in
the network. ‘This increased econom-
ic return provides incentives for
banks to establish additional ATMs,
thereby’ further enhancing the net-
works value to cardholders.
Accordingly, banks tend to place a
greater value on membership in a
network as its membership
expands.”
Some commentators have suggested
“See Grimm and bIte (1993).
“See Stevens (1993); fart and
Shapiro (1985).
Banc One Carp. 11995),
p. 494 n. 20.




“See Baxter, Coetner end Scott
11977).
/992 HorizontalMerger
Guidelines of the Department of
lastine and the Federal Trade
Cam,nissian, 4 Trade leg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 13,104, Section 4.0
(April 2, 1992). This bitt
statement by the two agencies
states that ‘the Agency will
reject claims of efficiencies if
eqeivalent ar comparable
savings can reasonably be
ochieved by the parties thraugh
other means... . load that the]
expected net efficiencies roust
be greater the name significant
ore the competitive risks identi-
fied .,., See FTC a.
University Health, Inn., 938
E2d 1206(11th Cir. 1991) (a
‘defendorrt wha seeks to over-
come a presumption that a pro-
posed ocquisitiot would
substantially lessen competition
must demonstrate that the
intended ocquisition would
result in significant economies




“See booc One Carp. (1995).
p. 497.
that the existence of network externalities
may counsel for a more laissez-faire
approach in analyzing payment systems
mergers.” Although the existence of net-
work externalities may suggest greater
potential for the existence of efficiencies,
that does not mean that those potential
efficiencies should lead to less antitrust
enforcement. Eirst, many of those efficien-
cies could be achieved by less restrictive
alternatives. In the ATM context, for
example, a subswitching arrangement
(between the two networks) may permit
the networks to achieve a level of ubiquity
(and consumer convenience) without
elimninating competition at the brand level.
Moreover, network externalities are
not without limit. William Baxter, the
former assistant attorney general in charge
of the antitrust division, has observed that
although ATM joint ventures can achieve
efficiency benefits related to economies of
scale, these efficiencies will cease to he sig-
nificant once a joint venture reaches a
certain size. Beyond the point where these
efficiencies are significant, Baxter suggests
that it is preferable to limit the size of the
network to encourage the creation of com-
peting networks rather than one large
network.”
The Board’s overall analysis of efficien-
cies in these cases seems lighthanded and
superficial. The approach taken by the
FTC and division and the courts require
the parties to demonstrate that the there
are no less anticompetitive means for
achieving the efficiencies and that these
benefits will be passed on to consumers.”
The Board did not consider these factors in
either Yankee 24-NYCE or Bane One Corp.
In Bane One Corp., the argument—
accepted by the Board—that NCB would
make cash infusions that would enable
EPS to continue and expand its research
and development efforts would not pass
this test because there are a number of
alternative sources of revenue to fund such
research. Similarly the economies of scale
recognized in Yankee24-NYCE could have
been achieved through a more limited
merger of the two networks’ back office
operations, while preserving competition
between the networks at the network
access level—similar to the ETC approach
in Eirst Data.
The vision of the regional network
monopoly Although the Board’s analysis
in these areas seems conventional, one
aspect of the decision in Bane One Corp.
poses an “ominous cloud on the horizon.”
In response to the concerns about the loss
of competition, the Board articulated a
vision of regional network monopolies
apparently fated by economics.
JT]he signmficant position oJ a
regional ATM network is not, stand-
ing alone, contrary to the public
interest. Network externnmlities, such
as the economies of ubiquity, tend to
promote consolidation oJ regional
ATM networks. As a result, invari-
ous geographic areas, like the
Mideast region, dominant ATM net-
works have been emerging through-
out the EETindustry. One recent
study indicates that the ten largest
regional networks now accountfor
80 percent of all regional ATM net-
work transactions in the United
States. In this light, the Board
believes that, as a result of economic
and market structure conditions,
regions are likely to have one dotni-
nant ATM network.”
The Board appears to view the road to
regional mnonopoly as foreordained and
dictated by the economics of networks. Is
chat vision correct? The enforcement
actions taken by the states in Entree and
the FTC in First Data suggest that
monopoly is not a foregone conclusion,
even in settings where there may appear to
he significant network externalities. In
both cases, the antitrust enforcers were
able to spur network competition by
focusing on the impediments to entry at
the brand level and carefully assessing effi-
ciencies at the systems level.
Ultimnately the Board’s view seemus to
harken back to the day when economics of
ubiquity placed ATM network mergers into
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